Sep 29, 2010
Is Indonesia outgrowing Asean?

OVER the past few months, there has been a debate within Indonesia as to whether the country's foreign policy should look beyond Asean. These observers contend that Indonesia should see itself as a major emerging power like Brazil, South Africa, India and China, with global interests.
Indonesia's foreign policy has reflected changes in its political system. In the 1960s, president Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' emphasised the role of the progressive 'New Emerging Forces', attracting strong support from the communist bloc and newly independent states even as he engaged in an undeclared war with his closest neighbours, which were backed by the West.
By contrast, president Suharto, after he came into power in 1965, focused on ties with the United States and Japan while consolidating links with states surrounding Indonesia.
Indonesia's foreign policy under president Suharto was conceived as a series of concentric circles: Asean, the West (as investors and trading partners) and multilateral engagement, from the United Nations to the Non-Aligned Movement).
However, more recently, Indonesia's participation in the Group of 20 (G-20), the rise of China and the belief that power is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific has led Indonesian analysts to argue that their country should play an independent role commensurate with its growing international influence.
Critics highlight Indonesia's lack of a capacity to act independently, arising from its commitment to Asean.
Proponents of a post-Asean foreign policy such as Dr Rizal Sukma argue that 'Indonesia should free itself from any undeserving obligation to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including Asean, if by doing so we sacrifice our own national interests'.
Indonesian decision-makers believe there is a two-speed Asean. The newer members such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam emphasise state sovereignty, non-interference and non-intervention, and approach issues such as human rights and democracy hesitantly. The older members are more positive on these issues but they have not been as willing as Indonesia to push for their inclusion in Asean agreements.
Indonesian critics such as Mr Jusuf Wanandi and Dr Rizal feel that Asean has failed to adjust to the new global environment and is stuck in an authoritarian mindset. They see Indonesia as an outlier within Asean, though it is by far the largest Asean state.
However, key foreign policy makers such as President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa contend that Asean is central to Indonesia even as Indonesia plays an active role in the G-20, the Muslim world and multilateral diplomacy.
Its Asean membership provides Indonesia with informal influence in these other international forums, as it is perceived as representing a much larger Asean entity.
Within Asean, Indonesian negotiators have been pushing the boundaries of discussions on issues such as democratisation in Myanmar, the need for an effective Asean human rights commission and the establishment of an Asean peace-keeping force.
However, Asean's consensual decision-making processes have meant that Indonesia has achieved considerably less than its maximum objectives.
This has resulted in criticisms of President Yudhoyono as indecisive, lacking in conviction and seeking to appease Indonesia's neighbours.
Unlike during the Suharto era, the reality today is that the Indonesian government has to pay close attention to domestic opinion. Parliamentarians have blocked ratification of agreements reached by the executive branch, such as the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore. Indonesian analysts have criticised the compromises entailed in reaching agreement on the Asean Charter.
Relations with Malaysia have been strained by strong public opinion over territorial claims, maritime boundary disputes, the treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia and the belief that Malaysians regard Indonesians as poor cousins.
Used to Mr Suharto's willingness to provide space for Indonesia's neighbours, the other members of Asean, particularly its founding members, have not adjusted to the impact of Indonesia's young democracy on bilateral relations.
Increased public involvement in decision-making has been accompanied by strident calls for Indonesia's interests to be upheld and mass political mobilisation against perceived slights against the country.
Nevertheless, there are continuities in foreign policy that should be noted. Over the generations, Indonesian policymakers and the politically articulate public have shared the view that because of its size, abundance of natural resources, strategic location and status as the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia is entitled to deference in the region and influence globally. Its relative weakness because of the strong centrifugal tendencies within the state is forgotten in periods when central authority is strong and Indonesia's international prestige is high.
The picture that emerges is one where democratic governance has led to increased public pressures on the political leadership. The result is a more strident nationalism and a focus on the global stage. However, this re-alignment of foreign policy will not lead Indonesia to turn away from Asean. It will remain engaged in a quest for leadership within Asean while seeking recognition as a leading power through forums such as the G-20.
The writer is dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Think-Tank is a weekly column rotated among eight leading figures in Singapore's tertiary and research institutions.
Comments