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Friend seeker: in the Oval Office Barack Obama inspects a cartographic gift. He is aiming to deepen US co-operation with new ‘centres of influence’ |
Against a military backdrop, Barack Obama sounded a distinctly unmartial theme. Previewing his administration’s new national security strategy – its overarching doctrine on how best to protect America – the president told a May audience of graduating cadets at West Point military academy that the US needed to intensify its diplomatic efforts as “more countries and capitals” gain influence over the modern world.
His emphasis was no accident. One of the main themes of the doctrine, released last week, is the US push to deepen co-operation with what it calls “emerging centres of influence”.
But, as a Turkish-Brazilian deal with Iran showed last month, rising powers are using their increased influence in ways that often pit them against Washington. Also, as the fall-out continues from Israel’s attack this week on aid-bearing ships off the Gaza Strip, Washington is confronted with an apparent choice between bolstering relations with states on the ascendant – such as Turkey – and siding with its closest allies, particularly Israel.
“Emerging powers in every region of the world are increasingly asserting themselves,” the national security strategy observes in language very different from the rhetoric of George W. Bush’s presidency. “Individual nations are increasingly taking on powerful regional and global roles and changing the landscape of international co-operation.”
The Obama administration has been thinking about this for some time. In an address to the US-based Council on Foreign Relations last year, Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, specified the main countries concerned. “We will ...put special emphasis on encouraging major and emerging global powers – China, India, Russia and Brazil, as well as Turkey, Indonesia, and South Africa,” she said.
While the administration’s desire for better relations with Moscow, Beijing and Delhi has been widely documented, the drive to work with other rising powers is also a central part of its attempt to cope with an increasingly unmanageable world.
This is a reaction both to such nations’ growing economic strength and to the Bush administration’s problematic reliance on “coalitions of the willing”. Such groupings often focused on small, loyal nations, while failing to enlist the support of regional leaders such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, South Africa and Indonesia.
Highlighting their increasing importance, those countries are today all members of the Group of 20 industrialised and developing nations, which has largely supplanted the western-dominated G8 in the wake of the economic crisis. They also occupy an ambiguous place on the world stage. All are democracies. But that does not necessarily ensure they will side with the US on the big international issues, even against authoritarian China.
Indeed, Beijing has skilfully played on its status as a developing nation and a former victim of western imperialism to create emotional bonds with other rising powers. China now also has a weight in the international economy that can rival America’s. It has already displaced the US as the largest trading partner of both Indonesia and South Africa, and is vying to do the same in trade with Brazil.
On a range of issues, from climate change to nuclear proliferation, the US has become painfully aware that it cannot take emerging powers’ support for granted. The deal that in spite of Washington’s misgivings Turkey and Brazil reached with Iran – for Tehran to ship enriched uranium abroad – was only the most recent setback to US hopes. It followed the chastening experience of the Copenhagen climate summit, at which the US found itself faced last December with an informal axis of developing nations, centred on China and including India, Brazil and South Africa.
In an April interview with the Financial Times, Mrs Clinton said she understood why rising countries might push back at the US because of their “global aspirations” and desires to play a leadership role. “I totally get that ... I don’t know why anybody would be surprised by that,” she said.
But she argued that there was no alternative to the US stepping up its engagement with such countries: “If you really listen and you respond, you may not agree on everything but you find areas of agreement.”
BRAZIL BEYOND ITS HEMISPHERES
Lula’s ‘friends with all’ approach strains relations with the US
Last month, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad of Iran raised their clasped hands together in Tehran and proclaimed a “victory of diplomacy”.
Brazil’s “friends with everyone” foreign policy, privately derided by US diplomats as unrealistic, even naive, appeared to have paid off in spectacular fashion.
“Our language is that of persuasion, friendship and co-operation,” said Celso Amorim, Brazil’s foreign minister, after Tehran agreed to send uranium abroad for further enrichment, which the US and its allies had tried to talk it into for months.
Washington points out that under the deal in principle, Iran would be dispatching less than half its stockpile of almost 2.5 tonnes of low enriched uranium. That total is enough, if further processed, to yield fissile material for at least two bombs, although Tehran insists its programme is purely peaceful.
Turkey and Brazil reply that the deal is based on a proposal the US backed last year.
Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, adds that the deal abides by benchmarks US President Barack Obama set out in recent letters to Mr Lula da Silva and Mr Erdogan: for the shipment to be no less than 1,200kg; for time to be allowed for other countries to provide Tehran with nuclear fuel in exchange; and for Iran to give formal notice of its plans for “constructive” engagement.
Now neither side is happy. Largely because of US objections, the deal’s future is deeply uncertain. Meanwhile, Turkey and Brazil’s continuing opposition to sanctions on Iran has dented the image of global unity against Tehran that Washington wished to foster.
“The raw, naked truth is that Iran, which was sold to the world as some kind of devil that wouldn’t sit down and talk, decided to sit down at the negotiating table,” Mr Lula da Silva said on his return from Tehran.
Brazil’s choice of friends has not been universally hailed, however. Mr Lula da Silva was criticised for receiving Mr Ahmadi-Nejad in Brasília last year.
Furthermore, while the administration of George W. Bush often depicted Brazil as a moderating force in Latin America and seemed to view its connections to figures such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez as a means of containing extremism, the two biggest economies in the Americas have found themselves increasingly at loggerheads since Mr Obama took office.
After last year’s coup in Honduras, which both governments condemned, the US led those countries in favour of recognising subsequent elections while Brazil led those refusing to do so. Jonathan Wheatley and Daniel Dombey
One of the central assumptions of the Obama administration is that the biggest foreign policy issues, such as financial reform and nuclear arms control, can now be tackled effectively only on a global basis. “We are not going to be able to solve any of these problems alone – we have to work with other nations,” says Anne-Marie Slaughter, the State department policy chief. She says such co-operation cannot wait for the reform of international institutions.
So the battle is on for the favour of the emerging powers. Mr Obama made his first set-piece speech abroad in the Turkish parliament in April last year. In just one day last month, he treated President Felipe Calderón of Mexico to only the second State dinner of his time in the White House – significantly, the first was for Manmohan Singh, Indian prime minister – and set aside time for a long phone call with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s leader. This month, he heads to Indonesia on a long scheduled (and twice delayed) trip to the country where he spent part of his childhood.
Still, by all appearances, such efforts are not paying an immediate dividend. The deal on Iran heralded by Turkey and Brazil – both of which have temporary seats on the United Nations Security Council – shattered any image of international unity on Tehran’s nuclear programme. Washington was quick to criticise it, in a move some commentators say showed that, rather than genuinely engaging with emerging countries, the US merely wants them to follow its lead.
Such ill feeling between the US and Turkey, two countries allied for more than half a century, has taken aback even the most seasoned of observers. “I’m not surprised that Brazil has taken the position it did on the Iranian issue,” says Henry Kissinger, one of Mrs Clinton’s best-known predecessors. “I didn’t expect Turkey.”
All the same, the strains between the two are probably greater than with any of the other midsized rising powers – a result not just of very different perspectives on sanctions against Iran but also of increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey after the Iraq war and Washington’s fears about signs of possible authoritarianism within Mr Erdogan’s government.
Ankara’s furious reaction to the Israeli attack on the ships heading to Gaza – three of which flew the Turkish flag – has further highlighted tension. With Washington balking at joining the criticism much of the world has directed at Israel, Turkey’s government has called on the US to take a tougher line.
Yet the Obama administration still sees Turkey as a country with enormous potential influence in the Middle East and beyond – and therefore one it cannot afford to neglect.
Also indispensable is Brazil, identified more than ever as Latin America’s heavyweight, with which the US has co-operated closely over issues such as the Haitian earthquake in January. But as with Turkey, Washington is at loggerheads with Brasília on Iran, perhaps the Obama administration’s top diplomatic priority.
Mr Kissinger argues that a long period in which Latin American countries were absorbed by their own domestic politics has ended for Brazil and, to some extent, for Mexico. “I think part of the challenge for American policy now would be to involve Latin America in a dialogue as countries that really play a role internationally and not just in the western hemisphere,” he says. “I would hope that we could get Brazil or countries of that group not to feel they need to oppose us.”
Washington is meanwhile trying to intensify co-operation with South Africa – where Vice-President Joe Biden will attend the soccer World Cup this month – on issues ranging from health to energy and nuclear non-proliferation. But the country has proved a difficult partner for the US in the recent past. Before President Jacob Zuma took office last year, the South Africans opposed western efforts to censure Burma’s and Zimbabwe’s human-rights abuses at the UN.
The US is also keen to continue cultivating Indonesia, as the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, the third-largest democracy and a strategically located nation in the Asia-Pacific region, in which many Obama officials believe the main events of the 21st century will be played out. Washington and Jakarta have co-operated closely to combat Jemaah Islamiyah, the regional affiliate of al-Qaeda.
But the limits of US influence are clear: officials have pronounced themselves frustrated with the low level of two-way trade – just $18.8bn (€15.4bn, £12.8bn) last year, based on International Monetary Fund figures – and what they characterise as protectionism, even as Indonesia’s trade with China ($23.5bn in 2009) lifts off after a south-east Asian free-trade agreement took effect this January.
The US effort to win over emerging powers is complicated by the fact that traditional allies such as Britain, Japan and Poland have let it be known that they feel neglected by the new focus. On Wednesday Yukio Hatoyama, Japan’s prime minister, resigned after backing down in a dispute with the US over a marine base. The president has recently sought to reaffirm links with old friends, praising the US-UK special relationship, while the national strategy emphasises traditional alliances as the “foundation” of American security.
Mrs Clinton bridles at a suggestion that the US is now a mere “convener-in-chief” focused on persuading other, often smaller, countries to address global issues. But she does acknowledge that such coaxing is now a central part of Washington’s role.
“We are the only global power in the world today and we accept that responsibility, but we also recognise that convincing people to go along with us requires different skills and a different way to exercise our power than it did 50 years ago or 100 years ago,” she says. “So we have soldiers fighting in two wars, which is hardly a convening, but it is [also] necessary to be constantly bringing people together.”
The problem is that bringing countries together – particularly states on the rise eager to leave their mark on the world – is no easy task. Strengthening ties is proving far harder than the Obama administration had bargained for, but it is difficult to see that it has any other choice.
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