First Person: Akbar Etemad
As told to David Patrikarakos
Published: July 11 2009 01:38 | Last updated: July 11 2009 01:38
Iran
has every right to pursue nuclear power. It is a matter of national
sovereignty. We should never have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
in 1968 – it was based on an unfair bargain. I believe that now, and I
believed it more than 40 years ago, when the Shah of Iran, Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, put me in charge of creating the country’s nuclear
programme.
In 1965 I had just finished studying reactor physics in Switzerland and arrived back in Iran. I had no job, no real plan of action – I had been away for 15 years. At the University of Tehran, the government was building a nuclear research reactor with US assistance through Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” programme. One day, I read in the paper that work had stopped because of a lack of expertise. An angry Shah had ordered the chairman of the National Planning Organisation to find a way to finish the project.
So I put all my diplomas in a bag and went to the chairman’s offices. His secretary didn’t want to let me in, but I said that if she told her boss there was a young Iranian at reception who knew about the atom, he would see me. He saw me. I detailed my qualifications and experience, and I still remember the relief on his face: “God has sent you through the window to us,” he said.
Two days later, he called me and said the Shah would personally authorise whatever it took to complete the reactor. After it was finished in 1967, I worked in several universities before the atom called me back. The 1973 oil boom meant that money was plentiful. The Shah asked if I would return. He gave me free rein to do whatever I wanted, so in 1974 I created the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. It worked directly under the Shah, and I was made deputy prime minister to make the lines of communication as clear as possible. My budget was almost limitless – we didn’t even have to produce accounts.
The Shah desperately wanted nuclear energy for Iran. He was adamant that a barrel of oil was too valuable to burn for fuel. We needed nuclear power so we could sell our petroleum.
But nuclear power is complicated. I had to ensure there could be no misunderstanding, so the Shah could make informed decisions. We began to meet every week, and I would teach him about nuclear technology. I started by saying, literally: “This is an atom; this is a molecule.” At the end of each session, I would hand him some papers and say, “Majesty, if you get the chance, look at this for next time.” He always did his homework, and he understood. I tested him.
Of course we discussed weapons – how could we not? But I broached the subject carefully. I wasn’t sure he would tell me his plans, and even if he did, I couldn’t take it as proof of intent. He might want weapons, tell me the opposite and then one day expect us to have the capability. So I always pursued every avenue of research and kept all options open.
He always said Iran didn’t need nuclear weapons because its conventional arms strength was sufficient. But he also said that if things ever changed – if our security was threatened – he would give the order to start building a deterrent. Iran has had uranium for years now. It’s just a raw material – you need to enrich it to have any effect. It’s like having enough rice to make a pollo [an Iranian dish]: meaningless in itself.
In 1979, I had to leave the country just before the Islamic Revolution. The Shah was no longer in control and the situation was becoming dangerous. Then the new government abandoned the project: a waste of money, they said. Now things have come full circle and the programme is a symbol of pride. I live in Paris, but I’m known in Iran as the founder of the programme. I went back for the first time in 2007. It was weird. Tehran had changed: the streets, the people, even the way people spoke. It was like being in a strangely familiar foreign country.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
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